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EXPOSURE DRAFT
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RISK TRANSFER IN PROPERTY AND
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SEPTEMBER 10, 1991

Prepared by the Reinsurance Auditing and Accounting Task Force
of the Insurance Companies Committee, Accounting Standards Division,
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
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800013

SUMMARY

Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
60, Accounting and Reporting by insurance Enterprises, provides guidance to insurance enterprises
on how to determine whether reinsurance contracts provide for indemnification against loss or
liability and on how to account for such contracts. In applying this guidance, each insurance
enterprise has to interpret the expression "indemnification . . . against loss or liability," which
could be interpreted differently for similar contracts.
This proposed statement of position (SOP) provides guidance for assessing risk transfer in property
and liability reinsurance contracts. It discusses the various kinds of risks involved, such as
insurance risk (which has t w o components —uncertainties about the ultimate amount of any claim
payments [underwriting risk] and uncertainties about the timing of those payments [timing risk]),
investment-yield risk, credit risk, and expense risk.
The proposed SOP concludes that a contract should be accounted for as providing reinsurance if
the ceding company's insurance risk (both underwriting and timing) has been transferred to the
assuming company. A ceding company's insurance risk has been transferred when all the
following conditions have been satisfied:
1.

The terms of the contract, for a fixed or reasonably determinable cost, provide for the
reinsurer to assume a specified level or percentage of the ceding company's claims
incurred or exposure to claim occurrences.

2. The terms of the contract, including any adjustable features, do not allow the ultimate
underwriting margin or deficit under the contract to be determinable in advance.
Therefore, after application of any adjustable features contained in the contract, there
should still be a reasonable degree of potential variability in the ultimate underwriting
results under the contract in relation to the total consideration paid. (For purposes of
applying this condition to contracts that provide for adjustments based on actual or
imputed investment earnings, such adjustments should be considered, as appropriate, in
determining whether the underwriting margin or deficit under the contract is determinable
in advance.)
3. The terms of the contract provide for the timely reimbursement of covered losses by the
reinsurer. Provisions that delay reimbursement to the ceding company, such as predetermined payment schedules, do not provide for the timely reimbursement of covered losses.
Reinsurance contracts that do not transfer both components of insurance risk must be accounted
for as deposits under the provisions of paragraph 40 of FASB Statement No. 60.
The proposed SOP provides guidance on accounting for reinsurance contracts and the disclosures
that should be made.
This exposure draft has been sent to —
• State society and chapter presidents, directors, and committee chairpersons.
• Organizations concerned with regulatory, supervisory, or other public disclosure of financial
activities.
• Organizations, firms, and individuals that the Reinsurance Auditing and Accounting Task
Force have identified as having an interest in assessing risk transfer in property and liability
reinsurance contracts.
• Persons who have requested copies.
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GUIDANCE FOR ASSESSING RISK TRANSFER IN
PROPERTY AND LIABILITY REINSURANCE CONTRACTS

INTRODUCTION
1. FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 60, Accounting and Reporting by
Insurance Enterprises, mentions several issues affecting insurance enterprises that were being and
continue to be studied by the insurance industry and the accounting profession. One is the
determination of the circumstances that constitute a transfer of economic risk under a reinsurance
contract. This statement of position (SOP) discusses the nature of risk transfer in property and
liability reinsurance contracts and accounting principles to be applied. It does not discuss the
assessment of credit risk, which is covered in the Audit and Accounting Guide Audits of Property
and Liability Insurance Companies.

ECONOMIC RISKS IN REINSURANCE CONTRACTS
2. Insurance enterprises are routinely involved in reinsurance transactions. Their major reasons
for doing so are to accomplish the following:
a.

Reduce their exposure on particular risks or classes of risks.

b.

Protect themselves against accumulations of losses caused by catastrophes.

c.

Reduce their premium volumes and total liabilities to levels appropriate to the amounts
of their capital.

d.

Obtain the ability to accept risks and policies involving amounts larger than they could
otherwise accept.

e.

Help stabilize their operating results.

f.

Obtain assistance with new products and lines of insurance.

Relevant Accounting Literature
3.
FASB Statement No. 60 currently provides guidance to insurance enterprises on how to
determine whether reinsurance contracts provide for indemnification against loss or liability and
on how to account for such contracts.
4.

Paragraph 40 of FASB Statement No. 60 states that
[t]o the extent that a reinsurance contract does not, despite its form, provide for
indemnification of the ceding enterprise by the reinsurer against loss or liability, the
premium paid less the premium to be retained by the reinsurer shall be accounted for as
a deposit by the ceding enterprise. Those contracts may be structured in various ways,
but if, regardless of form, their substance is that all or part of the premium paid by the
ceding enterprise is a deposit, the amount paid shall be accounted for as such. A net
credit resulting from the contract shall be reported as a liability by the ceding enterprise.
A net charge resulting from the contract shall be reported as an asset by the reinsurer.

In applying this guidance, each insurance enterprise has to interpret the expression "indemnification . . . against loss or liability." That expression could be interpreted differently for similar
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reinsurance contracts. Some interpret the expression to include indemnification against losses
resulting exclusively from risks that are unique to insurance. Others interpret it to include
indemnification against losses from such risks as well as other business risks not unique to
insurance, such as investment yield risk, credit risk, or expense risk.
5.
Some insurance enterprises account for certain reinsurance contracts that provide for
contingent commissions or retrospective experience adjustments as deposits, in accordance with
paragraph 40 of FASB Statement No. 60, based on the view that the underwriting result is
predeterminable.
Other enterprises, while conceding that the underwriting result may be
predeterminable, point out that the contract contains timing risk, investment yield risk, credit risk,
or expense risk. Accordingly, they account for such contracts as providing reinsurance.
6.
FASB Statement No. 60 does not describe the circumstances that constitute transfer of risk
in a reinsurance contract, but it implies that risk has not been transferred if "a reinsurance contract
does not, despite its form, provide for indemnification of the ceding enterprise by the reinsurer
against loss or liability." FASB Statement No. 60 thus requires that the substance of a reinsurance
contract, not its legal form, should determine whether a ceding company has been indemnified
against loss or liability. Such a determination is subject to the judgment of each person applying
the guidance to interpreting a reinsurance contract.
7.
To achieve consistent judgments about whether reinsurance contracts indemnify against loss
or liability as contemplated by FASB Statement No. 60, the kinds of risks that are involved need
to be understood.
Discussion of Risk
8.
Insurance risk involves uncertainties about the ultimate amount of any claim payments
(underwriting risk) and the timing of those payments (timing risk). An insurance contract provides
for the insurer to indemnify the insured against loss from such risks. Risk must be fortuitous —that
is, the possibility of adverse events occurring must be outside the control of the insured.
9.
A reinsurance contract is an agreement between the ceding company (the reinsured) and the
assuming company (the reinsurer) whereby the assuming company, for consideration received,
assumes all or a portion of the insurance risk. Such a contract provides that the assuming
company will indemnify the ceding company against loss or liability from that risk. However, the
legal rights of the insured are not affected by the reinsurance transactions and the insurance
company issuing the insurance contract remains liable to the insured for payment of policy
benefits.
10. In addition to insurance risk, reinsurance contracts involve other business risks including, but
not limited to, investment-yield risk, credit risk, and expense risk.
• Investment-yield risk pertains to uncertainties, other than the effect of timing risk, about
the ultimate amount of investment income that will be earned on the net funds received
under the reinsurance contract. Such risk includes not achieving expected returns or
obtaining expected future values.
• Credit risk relates to the risk that the amounts due or to become due under the contracts
may not be fully collectible. Such amounts include those currently due for reinsurance
recoverable on paid losses as well as amounts that will become due for reinsurance
recoverable on unpaid losses and amounts receivable under contingent commission or
profit-sharing arrangements.
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• Expense risk relates to the risk that acquisition and operating expenses may exceed
amounts expected when the reinsurance premium was established.
Conclusion
1 1 . To be accounted for as providing reinsurance, a contract should provide for indemnification
of the ceding company's insurance risk by the assuming company. Contracts that do not provide
for such indemnification should not be accounted for as providing reinsurance regardless of their
legal form. Those contracts are referred to in this SOP as financing arrangements. Reinsurance
contracts do not generally provide for indemnification of the ceding company against loss or
liability resulting from investment-yield risk, credit risk, or expense risk. Unless investment-yield
risk, credit risk, and expense risk are the risks being indemnified by the underlying primary
insurance coverage, they should not be considered in evaluating whether a contract indemnifies
the ceding company against loss or liability from insurance risk.
12. Many contracts that have elements of financing arrangements provide for indemnification of
insurance risk. However, if an analysis of the terms of an agreement indicates that the assuming
company's exposure to insurance risk is remote, such an agreement should be accounted for as
a financing arrangement. For example, a financing arrangement may contain provisions under
which the assuming company assumes insurance risk only at unrealistic loss ratios or levels.
Although such provisions may technically indemnify insurance risk, such risk is so remote as to
be incidental to the overriding substance of the arrangement. Nevertheless, the infrequency of the
loss, such as on certain catastrophe treaties, does not necessarily indicate that insurance risk is
not present.
13. A contract should be accounted for as providing reinsurance if the ceding company's
insurance risk (both underwriting and timing) has been transferred to the assuming company. A
ceding company's insurance risk has been transferred when all of the following conditions have
been satisfied:
a.

The terms of the contract, for a fixed or reasonably determinable cost, provide for the
reinsurer to assume a specified level or percentage of the ceding company's claims
incurred or exposure to claim occurrences.

b.

The terms of the contract, including any adjustable features, do not allow the ultimate
underwriting margin or deficit under the contract to be determinable in advance.
Therefore, after application of any adjustable features contained in the contract, there
should still be a reasonable degree of potential variability in the ultimate underwriting
results under the contract in relation to the total consideration paid. (For purposes of
applying this condition to contracts that provide for adjustments based on actual or
imputed investment earnings, such adjustments should be considered, as appropriate,
in determining whether the underwriting margin or deficit under the contract is
determinable in advance.)

c.

The terms of the contract provide for the timely reimbursement of covered losses by the
reinsurer. Provisions that delay reimbursement to the ceding company, such as
predetermined payment schedules, do not provide for the timely reimbursement of
covered losses.

14. Reinsurance contracts that do not transfer both components of insurance risk must be
accounted for as deposits under the provisions of paragraph 40 of FASB Statement No. 60.
Reinsurance contracts that transfer only timing risk have no bearing on whether the ceding
company should discount liabilities for unpaid claims and claim expenses.
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15. One ceding company may accomplish a specific reinsurance program through the use of
excess layers involving more than one reinsurance contract. Another ceding company may
accomplish this same objective through a single reinsurance contract. In assessing whether
indemnification against loss or liability has occurred in a multilayer program, it may be appropriate
to evaluate the aggregate results of the applicable reinsurance contracts rather than the results
of each individual contract.
16. Reinsurance contracts are often complex, so it may be difficult to evaluate whether a
reinsurance contract indemnifies against insurance risk. Such an evaluation requires a thorough
understanding of all the provisions of the contract and all related modifications. The presence of
any of the following factors in a contract may indicate that the conditions specified in paragraph
13 have not been satisfied:
• The agreement has cancellation or commutation provisions that would result in a loss to
the ceding company.
• The substance of the agreement is such that the present value of the consideration paid
by the ceding company and the present value of the scheduled reimbursement under the
agreement, at current interest rates, are substantially equivalent.
• The agreement has retrospective adjustments, sliding scale commissions, contingent
commissions, profit sharing, experience-rated refunds, or other similar provisions.
• The agreement does not constitute the entire understanding between the ceding company
and the assuming company.
• The agreement provides financial guarantees to the assuming company, either directly,
indirectly, or by side agreement.
• The agreement contains predetermined payment schedules or other provisions that delay
reimbursement to the ceding company.
• The agreement has provisions that require or permit the payment, directly or indirectly, of
additional consideration by the ceding company to the assuming company.
• The agreement does not provide for the periodic transfer of cash.
• The agreement has provisions for the subsequent assumption, either directly or indirectly,
of business previously ceded.
• The consideration to be paid by the ceding company is not reasonable in relation to the
amount of insurance risk transferred under the agreement.
• The financial viability of the assuming company is questionable.

ACCOUNTING FOR REINSURANCE CONTRACTS
17. A reinsurance contract can be prospective, retroactive, or both. Under a prospective
reinsurance contract, the ceding company pays a premium to the assuming company in return for
indemnification against loss or liability relating to events that occur following the effective date
of the contract. Under a retroactive reinsurance contract, the ceding company pays a premium
to the assuming company in return for indemnification against loss or liability relating to events
that have already occurred. Insurance risk may be indemnified in both prospective and retroactive
reinsurance contracts.
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18. Ceding companies should account for prospective reinsurance contracts that provide for
indemnification of insurance risk in accordance with paragraphs 38 and 39 of FASB Statement No.
60:
Amounts that are recoverable from reinsurers and that relate to paid claims and claim
adjustment expenses shall be classified as assets, with an allowance for estimated
uncollectible amounts. Estimated amounts recoverable from reinsurers that relate to the
liabilities for unpaid claims and claim adjustment expenses shall be deducted from those
liabilities. Ceded unearned premiums shall be netted with related unearned premiums.
Receivables and payables from the same reinsurer, including amounts withheld, also
shall be netted. Reinsurance premiums ceded and reinsurance recoverables on claims
may be netted against related earned premiums and incurred claim costs in the income
statement.
Proceeds from reinsurance transactions that represent recovery of acquisition costs shall
reduce applicable unamortized acquisition costs in such a manner that net acquisition
costs are capitalized and charged to expense in proportion to net revenue recognized
(paragraph 29). If the ceding enterprise has agreed to service all of the related insurance
contracts without reasonable compensation, a liability shall be accrued for estimated
excess future servicing costs under the reinsurance contract. The net cost to the
assuming enterprise shall be accounted for as an acquisition cost.
Assuming companies should account for such contracts the way they account for contracts they
write directly with insureds, in accordance with paragraphs 13 through 37 in FASB Statement No.
60.
19. Ceding companies should account for prospective reinsurance contracts that do not provide
for indemnification of insurance risk in accordance with paragraph 40 of FASB Statement No. 60,
which states that "the premium paid less the premium to be retained by the reinsurer shall be
accounted for as a deposit" by the ceding company. Assuming companies should account for
such contracts similarly, recording the net premiums to be returned to the ceding enterprise as
liabilities.
20. Ceding companies should account for retroactive reinsurance contracts that provide for
indemnification of insurance risk by reducing their liabilities for unpaid claims for amounts indemnified by the contracts and recognizing a gain or loss equal to the difference between the amounts
by which the liabilities are reduced and the amounts owed reinsurers under the contracts.
2 1 . An assuming company should account for such a contract as follows:
a.

Record at the inception of the contract—
• The consideration received.
• A liability equal to the ultimate amount of the claims assumed.
• A deferred charge equal to the difference between the amount of the claims assumed
and the consideration received from the ceding company.

b. Amortize the deferred charge using the interest method over the period the claims are
expected to be paid.
The liability should be adjusted if estimates of the ultimate amount to be paid change. Increases
to the liability should be charged to claims incurred; decreases should be credited to the deferred
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charge. The amount of the unamortized deferred charge should not exceed the investment income
expected to be earned over the remaining amortization period.
22. A ceding company should account for a retroactive reinsurance contract that does not
indemnify insurance risk as follows: (a) The consideration paid should be recorded as a deposit,
and (b) the difference between the consideration paid and the amounts it expects to receive under
the contract should be recognized as investment income over the period specified in the contract
(or, if no period is specified, over the expected repayment period) using the interest method (see
Accounting Principles Bulletin (APB) Opinion No. 2 1 , paragraph 15).
23. An assuming company should account for such a contract as follows: (a) The consideration
received should be recorded together with a liability of the same amount, and (b) the difference
between the consideration it received and the amount it expects to pay under the contract should
be recognized over the period specified under the contract as a reduction of investment income
(or, if no period is specified, over the expected payment period) using the interest method (see
APB Opinion 2 1 , paragraph 15).

DISCLOSURES
24. Disclosure of the effects on policyholders' statutory surplus for contracts that have been
reported as financing arrangements under generally accepted accounting principles should be
made. Disclosure of the nature and significance of these financing arrangements to the insurance
enterprise's operations, including deposits paid and received during the year and amounts that are
recoverable from or payable to reinsurers, should be made.

EFFECTIVE DATE AND TRANSITION
25. This statement of position should be applied prospectively to contracts or arrangements
covered by it and entered into in fiscal years beginning after December 1 5 , 1 9 X X . Retroactive
application, by restating all prior years presented for contracts entered into on or before the
effective date, is encouraged but not required.
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APPENDIX: TREATY EXAMPLES

The following examples of reinsurance treaties, presented as exhibits, are provided to assist in
applying the provisions discussed in the text. The treaties are intentionally oversimplified to
illustrate more clearly the application of the principles set forth in the SOP.
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Exhibit 1-LOSS PORTFOLIO TRANSFER

EXAMPLE 1: NO LIMITATIONS
Coverage:

Unpaid incurred losses as of December 3 1 , 199X. Although the best estimate
of unpaid incurred losses is $10 million, the ultimate amount to be paid could be
more or less than that amount.

Reinsurance
Premium:

$7 million

Settlement:

Promptly on payment of covered losses

Analysis:

There is uncertainty about the amounts that will ultimately be paid under the
contract as well as the timing of those payments.

Conclusion:

All the conditions in paragraph 13 have been met, so the contract should be
accounted for as reinsurance. (Both underwriting and timing risk are transferred.)

EXAMPLE 2: CESSION OF AMOUNT
Coverage:

$ 10 million of unpaid incurred losses as of December 3 1 , 199X. If less than $ 10
million of losses is ultimately to be paid, only the amount of losses paid will be
recovered from the assuming company.
Although the reserves are stated at $10 million, which represents the lower
range of the estimated unpaid losses, it is probable that the ultimate amount to
be paid will be that amount ($10 million) or more.

Reinsurance
Premium:

$7 million

Settlement:

Promptly on payment of covered losses

Analysis:

The substance of the contract is that the full amount of the coverage will be paid
because it is probable that ultimate losses will exceed $10 million.

Conclusion:

The underwriting margin or deficit under the contract is determinable in advance,
so the second condition of paragraph 13 has not been met. The contract should
not be accounted for as reinsurance. (Underwriting risk has not been transferred.)
If the facts change such that it is probable that the ultimate amounts to be
paid will be less than $10 million, the second condition of paragraph 13 will be
met and the contract should be accounted for as reinsurance. (Both underwriting
and timing risk are transferred.)
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EXAMPLE 3: CESSION OF A LAYER
Coverage:

$10 million in excess of $20 million of unpaid incurred losses as of December 3 1 ,
199X. The best estimate of total unpaid incurred losses is $100 million.

Reinsurance
Premium:

$7 million

Settlement:

Promptly on payment of covered losses

Analysis:

The substance of the contract is that the full amount of the coverage will be paid
because it is probable that ultimate losses will exceed $30 million.

Conclusion:

The underwriting margin or deficit under the contract is determinable in advance,
so the second condition of paragraph 13 has not been met. The contract should
not be accounted for as reinsurance. (Underwriting risk has not been transferred.)
If the facts change such that it is probable that some amount less than $30
million will be paid, the second condition of paragraph 13 will be met and the
contract should be accounted for as reinsurance. (Both underwriting and timing
risk are transferred.)

EXAMPLE 4: RETROSPECTIVE PREMIUM ADJUSTMENT
Coverage:

Reinsurance
Premium:
Retrospective
Premium
Adjustment:

Unpaid incurred losses as of December 3 1 , 199X. It is probable that ultimate
losses under the contract will range from $10 to $15 million.

$7 million

Premiums will be increased dollar-for-dollar to the extent that actual losses
exceed $10 million such that the difference between the losses paid and the
premium will always be $3 million.

Settlement:

Promptly on payment of covered losses

Analysis:

The substance of the contract is that the full amount of the coverage, after
considering the retrospective premium adjustment, will be paid because it is
probable that ultimate losses will exceed $10 million.

Conclusion:

The underwriting margin or deficit under the contract is determinable in advance,
so the second condition of paragraph 13 has not been met. The contract should
not be accounted for as reinsurance. (Underwriting risk has not been transferred.)
If the facts change such that estimated unpaid incurred losses range from $8
to $12 million, the underwriting margin or deficit is no longer determinable in
advance. Therefore, the second condition of paragraph 13 will be met and the
contract should be accounted for as reinsurance. (Both underwriting and timing
risk are transferred.)
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EXAMPLE 5: NO LIMITATIONS ON RETROSPECTIVE PREMIUM ADJUSTMENT
Coverage:

Reinsurance
Premium:
Retrospective
Premium
Adjustment:

Unpaid incurred losses as of December 3 1 , 199X. Although the best estimate of
unpaid incurred losses is $10 million, the ultimate amount to be paid could be
more or less than that amount.

$7 million

Premiums will be increased or decreased dollar-for-dollar to the extent that actual
losses differ from $10 million, such that total losses paid, adjusted for the
retrospective premium adjustment, will always be $10 million.

Settlement:

Promptly on payment of covered losses

Analysis:

Because the retrospective premium adjustment eliminates variability of the
amount to be ultimately paid, the underwriting margin or deficit is determinable
in advance.

Conclusion:

The underwriting margin or deficit is determinable in advance, so the second
condition of paragraph 13 has not been met. The contract should not be
accounted for as reinsurance. (Underwriting risk has not been transferred.)
If the facts change such that the retrospective premium adjustment is
substantially less than dollar-for-dollar, there will be a reasonable degree of
potential variability in the ultimate underwriting result under the contract.
Therefore, the second condition of paragraph 13 will be met and the contract
should be accounted for as reinsurance. (Both underwriting and timing risk are
transferred.)

EXAMPLE 6: PREDETERMINED PAYMENT SCHEDULE
Coverage:

Unpaid incurred losses as of December 3 1 , 199X. Although the best estimate
of unpaid incurred losses is $10 million, the ultimate amount to be paid could be
more or less than that amount.

Reinsurance
Premium:

$7 million

Settlement:

Settlements are according to the following:
Amount

End of Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
Note:

$2
2
2
2

million
million
million
million
Note
Actual claim payments

Actual claim payments through year 5 less $8 million
16

It is probable that settlements per the above schedule will result in a delay in
reimbursement to the ceding company for covered losses.
The existence of the predetermined payment schedule significantly reduces the
magnitude of timing risk, which has been transferred.
Because the third condition of paragraph 13 has not been met, the contract
should not be accounted for as reinsurance. (Timing risk has not been transferred.)
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Exhibit 2-PROSPECTIVE QUOTA SHARE REINSURANCE CONTRACT

EXAMPLE 1: NO ADJUSTMENTS
Coverage:

40 percent of losses applicable to a block of business

Reinsurance
Premium:

40 percent of premiums applicable to that block

Reinsurance
Commission:

25 percent of reinsurance premiums

Settlements:

Premiums, losses, and commissions are to be settled quarterly by cash transfers.

Analysis:

Underwriting risk has been transferred because the underwriting margin or deficit
on the contract cannot be determined in advance. Under this contract, timing
risk is indemnified because settlements are made on a timely basis.

Conclusion:

All the conditions of paragraph 13 have been met, so the contract should be
accounted for as reinsurance. (Both underwriting and timing risk are transferred.)

EXAMPLE 2: WITH REASONABLE ADJUSTMENTS
Coverage:

40 percent of losses applicable to a block of business

Reinsurance
Premium:

40 percent of premiums applicable to that block

Reinsurance
Commission:

25 percent of reinsurance premiums

Retrospective
Commission
Adjustment:

Settlements:

The target loss ratio is 73 percent. The commission is adjusted upward or
downward as the actual loss ratio deviates from the target ratio. For example,
if the subject loss ratio is 65 percent, the commission is adjusted upward by 8
percent. If the subject loss ratio is 80 percent, the commission is adjusted
downward by 7 percent. The maximum adjustment is plus or minus 10 percent.
Loss ratios on this business have ranged from a low of 58 percent to a high of
92 percent over the last five years.
Premiums, losses, and commissions to be settled quarterly by cash transfers.
Contingent commission to be settled annually.
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Analysis:

It is reasonably possible that loss ratios on this business could be outside the
adjustment range, so underwriting margin or deficit is not determinable in
advance. Timing risk is indemnified because settlement is made on a timely
basis.

Conclusion:

All the conditions of paragraph 13 have been met, so the contract should be
accounted for as reinsurance. (Both underwriting and timing risk are transferred.)

EXAMPLE 3: UNREASONABLE ADJUSTMENT
Coverage:

40 percent of losses applicable to a block of business

Reinsurance
Premium:

40 percent of premiums applicable to that block

Reinsurance
Commission:

25 percent of reinsurance premiums

Retrospective
Commission
Adjustment:

The target loss ratio is 73 percent. The provisional commission of 25 percent
(resulting in the sum of the target loss ratio and provisional commission equaling
98 percent) is adjusted upward or downward as the actual loss ratio deviates
from the target loss ratio. For example, if the subject loss ratio is 80 percent, the
commission is adjusted downward by 7 percent. If the loss ratio is 60 percent,
the commission is adjusted upward by 13 percent. There is no limit to the
adjustment.

Settlements:

Premiums, losses, and commissions to be settled quarterly by cash transfers.
Contingent commission to be settled annually.

Analysis:

The retrospective adjustment has the effect of guaranteeing a profit of 2 percent
of premiums to the assuming company. Therefore, underwriting margin can be
determinable in advance. Timing risk is indemnified because settlements are
made on a timely basis.

Conclusion:

The contract does not meet the second condition of paragraph 13, so the
contract should not be accounted for as reinsurance. (Underwriting risk has not
been transferred.)
If the facts were changed such that, in addition to the commission adjustment based on deviations in the loss ratio, commissions also are adjusted based
on investment income from funds held by the assuming company, then the
underwriting margin under the contract will vary based on the timing of cash
flows and the actual investment income earned. As suggested in the parenthetical phrase of the second condition of paragraph 13, the commission adjustment
based on investment income should not be treated as additional consideration
under the contract for purposes of determining whether the underwriting margin
or deficit under the contract is determinable in advance. Therefore, the contract
does not meet the second condition of paragraph 13 and thus should not be
accounted for as reinsurance.
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Exhibit 3-EXCESS REINSURANCE CONTRACT

EXAMPLE 1 : PER OCCURRENCE, NO LIMITATIONS
Coverage:

Losses of $200,000 in excess of $650,000 per occurrence.
possible that losses within the layer could occur.

It is reasonably

Reinsurance
Premium:

10 percent of subject premiums

Settlement:

Promptly on payment of covered losses

Analysis:

Ultimate claim payments are uncertain and settlement is made on a timely basis.

Conclusion:

All the conditions in paragraph 13 have been met, so the contract should be
accounted for as reinsurance. (Both underwriting and timing risk are transferred.)

EXAMPLE 2: AGGREGATE EXCESS
Coverage:

Aggregate losses of $20 million in excess of $65 million. Aggregate excess
coverage. It is probable that estimated aggregate losses will significantly exceed
$85 million.

Reinsurance
Premium:

10 percent of subject premiums of $100 million

Settlement:

Promptly on payment of covered losses

Analysis:

Past experience indicates that the ultimate losses will be greater than $85 million.
Therefore, it is probable that the coverage of $20 million will ultimately be paid.

Conclusion:

The underwriting margin or deficit can be determined in advance. Therefore, the
second condition of paragraph 13 has not been met. The contract should not be
accounted for as reinsurance. (Underwriting risk has not been transferred.)
If the facts change such that, in addition to the original contract, the ceding
company also has negotiated a related aggregate excess reinsurance contract
($40 million in excess of $85 million), the aggregate excess contract should be
accounted for as reinsurance because ultimate claim payments are uncertain.
(The underwriting margin or deficit is not determinable in advance.) Furthermore,
the t w o insurance contracts should be evaluated in the aggregate because the
ceding company is accomplishing a specific reinsurance program through the use
of excess layers involving more than one reinsurance contract. (See paragraph
15.) After such evaluation, the original contract also should be accounted for as
reinsurance because ultimate claim payments are uncertain under both contracts.
(Both underwriting and timing risk are transferred.)
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Exhibit 4-CATASTROPHE REINSURANCE CONTRACTS

EXAMPLE: MULTI-LINE FUNDED CATASTROPHE AND EXCESS COVERAGE
Coverage:

Losses of $5 million in excess of $1 million per occurrence, limited each year to
Exposure Fund balance at beginning of year (as defined below), plus $10 million

Settlement:

Promptly on payment of covered losses

Exposure
Fund:

At beginning of year:
premium
Credits to the fund:
Charges to the fund:
balance

Exposure fund at end of previous year plus current year
Interest on positive fund balance
Claims paid for the year, plus interest on deficit fund

Exposure fund end of year:
charges to the fund

Beginning year balance plus credits to the fund less

Annual
Reinsurance
Premium:

$10 million

Expense and
Risk Charge:

Annual charge equals the greater of
2.5 percent of assuming company's annual total liability
or
5.0 percent of premium due for the year

Termination:

The term is continuous, but the contract may be terminated by either party with
sixty days' prior notice. At termination, agreement will be automatically
commuted and the following will occur:
• The assuming company will return the positive amount in the exposure
fund, adjusted for unpaid claims to ceding company.
• The ceding company will reimburse the assuming company for any
negative amounts in the exposure fund, adjusted for unpaid claims if the
ceding company terminated the agreement.

Analysis:

The following summarizes how the terms of the contract were applied to each
condition for transferring insurance risk in paragraph 13 of the exposure draft:
• Assuming company assumes specific level of claims.
• Deficit pay-back clause eliminates the variability in the underwriting
margin or deficit. Thus, the assuming company is guaranteed of making
a profit equal to the expense and risk charge.
• Although there is timely reimbursement for covered losses, the interest
debit clause limits the assuming company's exposure to timing risk.
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Conclusion:

All the conditions of paragraph 13 have not been met, so the contract should not
be accounted for as reinsurance. The risk and expense charge should be
recognized in income, currently.
If the facts change such that at termination the exposure fund balance is
shared in proportions resulting in a reasonable degree of potential variability in the
ultimate underwriting results under the contract, the second condition of
paragraph 13 will be met. Also, if shared proportions result in a reasonable
variability in the assuming company's exposure to timing risk, the third condition
of paragraph 13 will be met. Accordingly, the contract should be accounted for
as reinsurance. (Both underwriting and timing risk would be transferred.)
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